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Immigration detention remains in scope for publicly funded legal assistance: indeed the argument 
that detention is legitimate rests partly on the claim that people can challenge it. Key safeguarding 
principles to ensure the immigration detention complies with the rule of law include access to 
‘prompt, continuing, adequate legal assistance, state-funded if unaffordable’.2 The Detention Duty 
Advice (DDA) scheme was set up to provide prompt access to free legal assistance and continuing 
advice to those eligible under legal aid rules. However, analysis of available evidence raises concerns 
regarding variation in detainees’ access to legal assistance and the quality of said assistance. 
 
This submission is based on research exploring access to legal assistance in detention, carried out 
in autumn 2017 and summer 2020, including: (1) Review of relevant material published by 
government, parliamentary committees, independent inspectors, civil society groups, legal media 
and academic researchers; (2) Analysis of relevant data from the Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals 
Service (HMCTS), Legal Aid Agency (LAA) and the charity Bail for Immigration Detainees (BID); (3) 31 
interviews, focusing primarily on legal professionals working with detained clients, but also including 
some people on immigration bail, migrant support workers, three immigration judges, and people 
involved in managing and monitoring legal aid services. 
 
The DDA scheme has been a vital tool in ensuring people detained under immigration powers 
have some access to legal advice. Prior to 2010, although any legal aid solicitor could represent 
people held in Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs), it could be hard for people to make contact with 
solicitors. Since 2010, the DDA scheme has provided more structured access to legal advice in 
Immigration Removal Centres. It has survived a decade in which the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) radically cut the scope of immigration legal aid. 
Alongside their immigration legal aid contract, a number of firms hold additional contracts to run 
advice surgeries in designated centres, providing up to ten advice appointments per day.3 From 
September 2018 to June 2020 nearly 19,000 such appointments were made with DDA providers by 
people in detention.4 The LAA expects that providers will take on all eligible cases, although they can 
decline for ‘good cause’ (explored more below).5  
 
In Sept 2018, some important changes were made to the DDA scheme. Prior to this, surgeries were 
run by around 8 providers, with the largest Duncan Lewis responsible for around half of the surgery 
weeks in 2017/18.6 There were a combination of pressures to modify the system: access to justice 
concerns about waiting times and quality issues; commercial complaints about a small number of 
providers having exclusive detention contracts; and public sector contracting concerns about 
dependency on those few providers. In Sept 2018, the LAA awarded contracts to all eligible bidders, 
dividing surgeries among some 75 firms.7 The DDA scheme still does not extend to prisons, a major 
issue dealt with elsewhere – this submission focuses on IRCs.8  
 
Waiting times remain an issue for people with urgent cases or acute vulnerabilities. Given the 
gravity of depriving someone of their liberty on administrative grounds, prompt contact with a legal 
advisor is important. Moreover, if someone is refused asylum or given a deportation order, they 
have 14 days to appeal the decision, and if they are given notice of a removal window, they have 72 
hours before the removal could take place. While waiting times seem to have moderated (consistent 
with reduction of the number of people detained in IRCs), for people with urgent removal cases a 
few days can have serious consequences. While there are policy provisions that in removal cases 
individuals need to have reasonable opportunity to access legal advice and recourse to the courts, 
asserting this requires individuals to know their rights.9 For instance, at the time of writing, there is 
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an intensification of efforts by the Home Office to remove people under the Dublin III Regulation to 
other EU member states, before this possibility ceases with the end of the Brexit transition period. 
Despite the LAA increasing the number of surgeries at Brook House, solicitors were concerned that 
people due for removal on charter flights were not all getting access to legal advice.  
 
Lawyers interviewed were unanimous that it is hard to fit what they need to do into the 30 minute 
appointment, i.e. ascertain the basic facts of the person’s case, offer some advice and decide 
whether the detainee qualifies for legal aid. People have to first be brought to the legal visits area by 
IRC staff, may be distressed and/or mistrustful, may need a telephone interpreter, may show up 
with bags full of documents or none at all. BID’s Legal Advice Survey respondents generally did not 
describe the advice they received at this appointment as useful in itself, which points to the 
challenge at hand; in this context, it is particularly concerning that the same respondents reported 
appointments generally lasting less than 20 minutes and sometimes being extremely brief.10 Since 
March 2020 legal visits have been cancelled (except in exceptional circumstances) and the DDA has 
run as a telephone service; this makes it harder to examine detainees’ documents, with solicitors 
reporting variability between detention centres in terms of how effectively IRC staff facilitate the 
transmission of necessary information. 
 
Concerns were raised that solicitors sometimes fail to recognize the merits of people’s cases.11 
Interviewees noted that while there are some cases with no merit, the test for Legal Help (LH) is 
‘sufficient benefit’, which is easily passed by a lot of people. The test for Controlled Legal 
Representation (CLR) is moderate (50%+) prospects of success, and on this basis many people in 
detention qualify for CLR for bail applications, something underscored in legal aid guidelines.12 In 
addition, many people in detention have substantive immigration cases that are in scope, or eligible 
for Exceptional Case Funding (ECF), and have merit. But interviewees raised concerns that DDA 
solicitors are not consistently identifying where people in detention are eligible for legal aid on 
merits, citing a tendency to overlook the merits of (a) bail applications suggesting a poor 
understanding of the process, (b) more complex and challenging cases (e.g. 3rd country cases, 
trafficking, urgent removals) where lacking expertise and (c) eligibility for ECF owing to the 
additional paperwork burden and poor awareness of the (now) rather high success rates. Migrant 
support organisations try to address these gaps by signposting detainees to other DDA providers, 
preparing ECF applications to help convince potential solicitors, referring them to pro bono 
providers and firms with public law legal aid contracts for judicial review work. 
 
Concerns were also raised about the means test for legal aid.13 While people in detention on 
asylum allowances may be ‘passported’ through, others must gather necessary proof of means. 
Practitioners commented that people who fail the means test often do so by very little and still 
struggle to pay for a lawyer privately. Gathering evidence of means can be challenging, particularly if 
a partner’s income must also be assessed, or a landlord has disposed of the person’s belongings.  
 
Variation in take-up rates between firms is dramatic. FOI data suggests that collectively DDA 
providers carrying out surgeries in Sep 2018 – Jun 2020 opened Legal Help matters for around a 
quarter of the people seen.14 What is particularly striking, given the random allocation of detainees 
to appointments, is the variation between providers: 8 firms opened Legal Help for more than 50% 
of people seen in surgery, but many had much lower rates, some appearing ‘to be operating a 
blanket practice of avoiding taking on clients at the surgery’.15 While sometimes individuals rejected 
for legal aid or receiving poor service will manage to secure another legal aid provider, this 
underscores the ‘hit and miss’ quality of the process.16  
 
Where clients are taken on, representation can fall short. An HMIP survey in Brook House IRC 
showed that only one third of those who did have a solicitor had received a legal visit.17 One solicitor 
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interviewed had recently taken on a couple of clients who had been with other DDA solicitors for 4-6 
months who had not done a bail application for them. Another shared a list of eligible cases they 
had picked up after other DDA solicitors had failed to act, for people who were vulnerable and had 
unlawful detention and urgent removal cases. 
 
In the community, low legal aid fees pose issues for solicitors, but this seems to be somewhat less 
of an issue in relation to taking on work for people in detention. The LAA pays for CLR work started 
while the client is in detention on hourly rates; for Civil Representation, although investigative work 
‘at risk’ is often required to apply for funding, if approved then payment is on higher hourly rates 
and there is possibility of winning costs at commercial rates and bringing damages claims.18 The DDA 
issue seems to be more about knowledge and human resources. 
 
Knowledge is critical to providers’ ability to deliver. Detention is a specialist, fast-changing area of 
law. DDA firms no longer need to have an Advanced/Supervising caseworker (Immigration and 
Asylum Accreditation Scheme Level 3)19 but must deploy to surgeries a Senior Caseworker (Level 2), 
formally accredited to carry out the full range of immigration and detention legal aid work. But 
‘Running a surgery is hard, you have people coming with all kinds of problems, their lives are literally 
in your hands...’20 Another solicitor noted ‘A feature of detention is that the cases are more urgent, 
and people are more vulnerable.’21 With surgeries spread among so many providers, new 
practitioners may have limited opportunity to build up that expertise and there is a risk of deskilling 
more experienced lawyers.22  
 
Capacity is also critical to providers’ ability to deliver. Until Sept 2020 the rota was organized on a 
weekly basis, such that the duty solicitor might encounter up to 50 potential clients in a surgery 
week, including urgent removal cases, indeed potentially a large number of urgent removal cases 
detained in the same IRC prior to a charter flight. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association 
(ILPA) commented the many newer, smaller providers did not seem to have appreciated the capacity 
they might need to deliver on their obligations. Sole providers and consultants are also inevitably 
under more cashflow pressure than salaried solicitors to close matters and bill, which may act as a 
disincentive against taking on lengthy complex individual matters. 
 
The LAA does have monitoring mechanisms in place, but its audit and contract management 
processes focus on procedural compliance rather than the quality of legal work. Practitioners 
complain that the LAA picks up on very minor errors, to the point where some interviewees felt that 
the aim of audits is to trip them up, arguing that the process imposes a discipline that goes beyond 
assessing eligibility and has the effect of deterring lawyers from taking on less-than-straightforward 
clients, for fear of not being paid.23 The LAA emphasizes that complaints about the substantive 
quality of legal aid work should be directed to the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the 
professional bodies, although it might also trigger referral of the provider for LAA’s peer review 
system.  
 
The carefully designed peer review system focuses squarely on the quality of legal aid work 
carried out, but there is considerable room for manoeuvre in how the results are used. Providers 
must maintain a threshold competence rating to retain their legal aid contract. When they fail (as 
was the case for 5% of immigration providers peer-reviewed in 2017-18 – relatively high compared 
with other categories of legal aid work),24 there is a chance to improve their performance ahead of a 
second review, and few of the more severe penalties have been imposed on DDA providers in recent 
years.25 Recognizing the pressures on the legal aid industry and scarce capacity in some geographic 
areas/categories of work, the focus is on ascertaining basic competence and ensuring provision. 
Having scored a high rating at peer review does not seem to put a firm in a stronger position vis-à-vis 
the contract bidding process in the context of the current public procurement practices.  
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Thus the LAA’s monitoring mechanisms focus on procedural compliance and basic competence of 
legal aid work that is carried out, with few means of monitoring what is not done. As things stand, 
although providers are required to fill out some basic paperwork for each appointment, the LAA 
does not check whether people are correctly rejected for legal aid – it works on the basis that if a 
detainee is eligible, the provider will take them on. Some interviewees pointed to the Civil Contract 
Specification which allows providers to decline eligible cases for ‘good cause’, including if they lack 
the capacity or skill/expertise to take on the case. But DDA providers are supposed to liaise with the 
LAA if they lack capacity, and are required to be accredited at IAAS Level 2 which implies that they 
are able to undertake the full range of legal work with detained clients.  
 
Across the professional spectrum, legal professionals have reached some pretty damning 
conclusions about legal aid in detention. A solicitor told a government committee: ‘Everyone who 
works in this field knows that most instances of unlawful detention go unchallenged.’26 A barrister 
remarked: ‘It is nonsensical to say there is legal aid for detention, because [of] the hurdles you have 
to go through… Loads of instances of unlawful detention are going by without any applications being 
made.’27 An NGO worker commented: ‘The whole myth of legal aid, and “we’re OK detaining people 
because they have access to legal remedies” just doesn't play out in practice.’28 A judge stated: 
‘Legal aid cuts are having real consequences on quality. If you want to sneeze, a quality 
representative needs permission from the LAA but many people are having to fall back on their 
communities and it makes it easier for the charlatans.’29  
 
Many people turn to private solicitors or pro bono services. Some people get a good service from 
private advisors, but ILPA noted: ‘There are people who are doing their incompetent best and it is 
not good enough.’30 Welfare officers and visiting projects often refer people to charities and pro 
bono law clinics like BID. But this support has been squeezed, as lawyers are already often doing so 
much unpaid work within legal aid cases; and voluntary sector clinics are struggling to make ends 
meet.31  
 
Some people have no professional legal support. A judge noted that since LASPO: ‘We see far more 
litigants in person. It is shocking when you consider that this is about liberty, a key human right.’32 
Many may not make it to court in the first place, but when they do the adversarial nature of the 
court system is a challenge. BID has a self-help guide for bail applications translated into key 
languages.33 But access to legal help organisation websites is frequently blocked.34 In the absence of 
a statistically representative survey of the legal needs of immigration detainees, we have a limited 
understanding of the extent of unmet demand. In BID’s twice-yearly Legal Advice Survey, rates of 
representation dropped after LASPO to around 50%, with around 20% private and 30% legal aid; 
although legal aid representation improved somewhat to around 40% in 2019.35 According to 
HMCTS data, in 2017-mid 2019, around 20% of bail applicants lacked legal representation – but 
many without representation will not make it to court in the first place.36 
 
There is limited evidence on the impact of legal assistance. Represented applicants’ odds of 
securing a grant of bail averaged 36% in 2017-19, compared with 21% for unrepresented 
applicants.37 We do not know what proportion of these outcomes were secured with a legal aid 
solicitor. More research would be needed to ascertain causality.38 Indeed one might well ask why, 
given the purported advantages of legal representation, outcomes are not more significantly better 
for represented applicants. It is also quite plausible that it is not just having representation that 
counts, but having good representation: ‘In this system… poor quality representation is not going to 
tip the balance.’39 The impact of (lack of) representation has wider human costs as well as public 
finance implications in terms of detention estate spending, court time, and scope for unlawful 
detention compensation claims.  
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The LAA has engaged with external stakeholders and has made some adjustments. Pre-Covid it 
agreed to prioritise peer review of immigration legal aid providers that hold IRC contracts; and 
initiated discussion with the Law Society regarding if/how the IAAS Level 2 qualification might be 
adjusted to ensure appropriate expertise for detention work. In July, it published an ‘Immigration 
Removal Centre Practical Guide’ for DDA firms, underscoring key points, noting that while there are 
no KPIs for conversion rates contract managers will be reviewing low take-up rates. In September, 
the DDA scheme shifted from a weekly to a daily rota, which should mean small providers are having 
to deal with up to 10 instead of 50 potential new clients at one time, making the workload more 
manageable.40  
 
But this is not enough. It is important to note that it is problematic immigration, detention and 
removal decision-making by the Home Office that makes recourse to the courts so frequent and 
necessary, triggering the need for legal assistance.41 But given this context, better access to 
competent, free immigration advice could help many people resolve their immigration status or 
make plans to leave the UK, letting people get on with their lives sooner and avoiding costly 
detention.42 Indeed ‘[T]he first contact some migrants have with a lawyer is after they are detained, 
at which point it may finally emerge that they have a good case for remaining in the UK.’43 The DDA 
scheme thus plays a vital role, but there are indications of people falling through the cracks. The 
analysis above particularly suggests there needs to be (1) some form of check on negative eligibility 
assessments worked into the system, to ensure that detainees eligible for legal aid are not left high 
and dry by overstretched providers; and (2) a modification of future IRC contract requirements in 
terms of firms’ capacity and qualification / quality indicators, more realistically to reflect what is 
needed of detention solicitors, to ensure access to justice.  
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